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MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF AF DEPOT BUSINESS PRACTICES FOR SUPPLY 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 A key aspect of the Air Force’s ability to accomplish its mission, “to fly, fight and win… 
in air space and cyberspace”, is the ability to sustain its war fighting equipment. To manage this 
need, the AF has established three Air Logistics Centers or Depots to execute the maintenance 
and overhaul activities for its entire fleet of aircraft.  The dynamic environment of these facilities 
is due to the desire to execute maintenance operations with both “speed and quality” (Schanz, 
2011) commiserate with the expectations of its chief customer, the warfighter. These 
requirements drive a careful ballet that occurs on a daily basis to continually improve production 
processes and manage parts demand, forecasting and availability on the shop floor. 
 Parts are supplied to the depots from several sources.  The Defense Logistics Agency 
(DLA) supplies consumable items for all services, and over 109,000 parts for the Air Force 
(Towell, 2011).  A consumable item is an item that when found defective on a weapons system is 
simply replaced and not repaired.  The Global Logistics Support Center (GLSC) is responsible 
for Air Force supply management of items that are repaired when found defective, or reparables.  
Some smaller portion of parts is supplied by maintenance contractors directly, outside of DLA 
and GLSC operations.  The coordination of each of these sources by depot staff is required to 
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ensure that parts are available to maintenance personnel when needed during Programmed Depot 
Maintenance (PDM). 
 The reality on the depot line is that parts are not always available to maintenance 
personnel when needed to complete a task.  The unavailability of parts will cause a delay in 
aircraft delivery to the field and result in further scrutiny from field managers and increased 
pressure on depot leadership.  To avoid these negative outcomes, the maintenance personnel seek 
to satisfy the demand for the unavailable component outside the normal parts supply processes 
and procedures.  These actions are referred to as heroics, which represent the additional burden 
the depot undertakes to deliver the aircraft in a timely manner. 
  
1.2 Problem Statement 
 Today, the need for heroics in meeting maintenance demand for parts at AF depots is 
likely due to efforts to reduce the cost of inventory and adoption of ‘just in time’ principles for 
inventory management.  These principles drive parts acquisition managers to avoid large 
procurements of hard to find or long lead time items and leads to a ‘procurement on need’ 
mentality.  The need for heroics, and subsequent negative impact on the maintenance 
organization, are not included in the total inventory costs use to plan parts purchases. The cost of 
heroic actions and their impact on ‘optimal’ procurement practices is not well understood. 
 Figure 1 shows a notional plot of the ‘Cost of Inventory’ and the ‘Cost of Parts Chasing 
& Waiting’, or heroics.  This plot indicates that there may be some optimal point that minimizes 
the total cost of chosen inventory levels to the Air Force based on inventory costs and the 
associated need for heroic actions.  This research focuses on modeling and analyzing Depot 
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business practices that characterize the heroics cost curve and their relationship with inventory 
planning. 
 
 
Figure 1: Cost of ‘Heroics’ Diagram (Gehret, 2011) 
1.3 Research Scope 
The impact of heroics on depot operations is a complex issue with elements of production 
labor time, equipment usage rates, engineering overheard, procurement specialist labor and many 
other unnamed elements.  This thesis will focus on the development of a model for the 
quantification of the impact of heroic actions on depot operations in terms of aircraft flow days 
and cost.  The model developed will specifically include the heroic actions that impact the 
Structures Build Up (SBUP) phase of PDM for the KC-135. 
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1.4 Approach 
This effort seeks to first, quantify the impact of heroics in terms of lost or inefficient 
labor time over several procurement scenarios and secondly, to use the lost hours in a calculation 
of the overall cost of these actions at the depot.  A discrete event simulation (DES) will be used 
to generate the lost or inefficient hour data.  The available data does not enable an analytical 
assessment of the costs associated with heroics and a DES provides a reasonable means to obtain 
that data for calculation. 
Using discrete event simulation is also useful for analyzing various model alternatives.  
In this effort a baseline case and alternate scenario are developed and assessed.  The ability to 
assess multiple scenarios based on inventory levels enables an initial assessment of the ‘Cost of 
Parts Chasing & Waiting’ curve, shown in Figure 1. 
   
1.5 Thesis Outline 
The remaining topics covered in this thesis are broken out into four distinct chapters. Chapter 
II covers a review of heroic actions, description of the KC-135 depot operations and a discussion 
regarding the most relevant sources related to the impact of heroics in a maintenance 
environment in the open literature.  Chapter III describes the development of a model for 
analysis of the impact of heroics, covering conceptual model development, Arena 
implementation and input data analysis.  Chapter IV presents the basic results and analysis 
executed using the model, including the analysis of an alternate inventory management scenario.  
Chapter V covers the final conclusions and recommendations for future work in the study of the 
impact of heroics on depot operations.  
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II. Literature Review 
2.1 Overview 
As part of the modeling process a review of available literature and sources for analyzing 
the impact of heroics on depot operations was executed.  Several basic topics were explored, 
including; a description and definition of the varying types of heroic actions, a background on 
KC-135 and published literature on the subject of alternate supply mechanisms for maintenance 
operations.  The most relevant findings are summarized in the subsequent sections of this 
chapter. 
 
2.2 Description of Heroic Actions  
The definition of heroics is not found in a Technical Order or Operating Instruction.  For 
the purposes of this paper, heroics were defined as actions taken whenever the demand for an 
item, consumable or reparable, was satisfied through means other than the normal supply chain 
or procurement process.  Individual heroic acts can be classified as one of eight identified actions 
discussed briefly in the following sections.  These descriptions were developed with support 
from many organizations within program offices and maintenance wings.  
A depot cannibalization is the removal of a fieldable component from one aircraft on the 
depot maintenance line and reinstalling the removed component into another aircraft for use.  
The depot often makes efforts to consolidate the ‘holes’ that remain when a part is cannibalized 
onto one aircraft.  This operation requires the replacement cost to double, due to the subsequent 
reinstallation of the proper component into the aircraft that was cannibalized.  Typical cost 
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elements for a depot cannibalization would include the mechanics time removing the component 
from the cannibalized aircraft and then reinstalling the same component on the same aircraft.  
Another commonly used term for depot cannibalization is ‘CANN’. 
An AMARG cannibalization is the removal of a fieldable component from an aircraft 
within the 309th
A lateral supply is the transfer of a component from one location to another to satisfy 
maintenance demand for that component.  These actions take a variety of forms; from one base 
to another, from one aircraft line to another within the same depot or from backshop to backshop 
within the same depot.  Line to line and backshop to backshop laterals are informal actions and 
are not tracked regularly. Base to base transfers of components are more defined processes which 
involve multiple organizations.  Such an action is often managed by the DLA or GLSC with 
support from program office and wing level engineering.  Typical cost elements include 
engineering/management overhead and shipping. 
 Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group (AMARG) at Davis-Monthan 
Air Force Base (AFB) and reinstalling the removed component into another aircraft at the Depot 
to satisfy component demand.  The AMARG is a storage facility for retired DoD aircraft.  At the 
request of a program office or maintenance wing, the AMARG will cannibalize an aircraft at 
Davis-Monthan AFB and ship it to the depot for installation.  Typical cost elements for an 
AMARG cannibalization would include the cost of AMARG technicians to remove the 
component, shipping costs and the cost of the depot to inspect and certify the component for use.  
Another commonly used term for AMARG cannibalization is ‘AMARG pull’. 
An emergency buy is a procurement process used to obtain parts for maintenance demand 
from an alternative supplier.  Such a purchase may consist of surplus parts owned by private 
parties or newly manufactured components, typically in small lots, when a current contract’s 
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terms will not satisfy depot demand.  Parts purchased via emergency buy processes are typically 
orders of magnitude more expensive than components purchased on planned regular 
procurements.  Typical cost elements include increased unit part cost, procurement specialist’s 
time and engineering/management overhead.  Another commonly used term for this type of 
action is ‘gap buy’. 
Depot manufacturing is the use of organic manufacturing capability to satisfy 
maintenance demand for components.  Depot manufacturing resources are used when a part 
cannot be purchased from the supplier base or lead time/cost considerations of supplier offers 
makes purchasing the item a less favorable option.  Typical cost elements include repair material, 
production labor, engineering/management overhead and production equipment time. 
A non-economical repair is a repair where the repair cost of parts and labor exceeds 75% 
of the replacement cost of parts and labor.  OC-ALC/GKC OI 21-109 defines an economical 
repair as "a repair where the repair cost of parts and labor does not exceed 75% of the 
replacement cost of parts and labor."  A non-economical repair is ordered when parts are not 
available to replace the item and it is repaired even though it does not meet the threshold as a 
reparable item.  Typical cost elements include repair material, production labor, 
engineering/management overhead and production equipment time. 
A deferral action delays a maintenance action until a subsequent PDM/overhaul cycle 
due to lack of components to service the aircraft or sub assembly.  Typical cost elements include 
program office engineers for tracking and approval, management overhead and potential for 
degraded weapon system capability or failure.  
 A field installation is a maintenance action that is delayed and scheduled as a field 
operation. Parts are then delivered to the field, when available, for service.  Typical cost 
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elements include field technician’s labor, management overhead and potential for degraded 
weapon system capability.  
 
2.3 KC-135 Programmed Depot Maintenance 
The KC-135 Stratotanker, originally produced by The Boeing Company, provides the 
Department of Defense with an aerial refueling capability, supporting the Air Force, Navy, 
Marine Corps and allied nations’ aircraft (Perez, 2012).  The aircraft can transfer up to 200,000 
lbs of fuel through its boom to receiving aircraft (see Figure 2 for photo) and is one of the oldest 
active aircraft in the Air Force inventory with over 50 years of service. The Air Mobility 
Command currently manages an inventory of 414 KC-135s in various configurations.  
 
 
Figure 2: KC-135 Refueling F-15 (Perez, 2012) 
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 The warfighter, in conjunction with the Tanker Program Office, looks to the maintenance 
wing at Tinker AFB to maintain the active fleet of KC-135 aircraft.  Every 60 months these 
aircraft go through a full PDM cycle to ensure the aircraft are safe and mission capable (Farris, 
2012).  As these aircraft age, the depots are asked to process an increasing number of aircraft 
through PDM each year, rising from 48 aircraft in FY08 to a projected 64 aircraft in FY12. To 
execute this task a team of over 1300 personnel, from both the production flight and weapon 
system support flight, are involved.   
 Over the past decade the KC-135 production system has undergone several major 
changes from a three piece flow concept in 2002, two piece flow in 2005, the single line concept 
in 2008 and to the current configuration, in 2009, with the staggered line concept (Farris, 2012).  
The staggered line concept has enabled the depot to reduce flow days from on average 224 days 
per aircraft to 128 days in early 2012. 
 The staggered line concept for KC-135 depot operations is divided into five production 
stations, as depicted in Figure 3.  The entry point to the depot is called Pre-Dock and is where the 
aircraft paint is stripped and washed down (Farris, 2012).  This process takes between 10-12 
days to complete. After washing is complete, the aircraft is moved to I-Dock for pre production 
inspections and some light inspections related to boom and landing gear refurbishment.  This 
station consists of five docks and takes between 15 and 17 days to complete.  The inspections 
that take place here form the basis for the negotiated bill of materials between the maintenance 
wing and program office.  Each aircraft has a pre existing bill of materials for the planned PDM 
work, but during I-Dock inspections unanticipated maintenance requirements often present 
themselves.  Once the inspections are complete, a full maintenance package and bill of materials 
is established and the aircraft then proceeds to the Structures Build Up (SBUP) station.   
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Figure 3: KC-135 PDM Flow Diagram (Farris, 2012) 
 
SBUP is where the majority of heavy maintenance occurs at the depot for the KC-135.  
This is the station where windows are replaced, electronics are refurbished, the engines are 
reinstalled, wing tips are repaired etc.  In all, there are about 26 major jobs that occur at this 
phase in the PDM operation (Schatz, 2012).  SBUP is where the staggered line concept derives 
its name. Here the aircraft are designated either extended flow or regular.  Extended flow aircraft 
are those that are anticipated to have a longer maintenance cycle time in SBUP based on data 
collected during the I-Dock inspections.  Extended flow aircraft are given positions in docks 8, 9, 
11 or 12 of the total docks in SBUP (Farris, 2012).  Positioning the extended flow aircraft in 
these docks minimizes the incidence of blocking regular flow aircraft in their docks, preventing 
them from proceeding to the next station, Systems Check.  
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Systems Check is where various pre flight inspections occur to verify that the aircraft 
systems are functioning properly after SBUP.  This station is divided into 5 docks and takes 
between 13 and 20 days to complete (Farris, 2012).   Once all checks are complete, the aircraft is 
moved to Post-Dock for repainting, refueling and engine checks.  This occurs on six dedicated 
docks and takes between 24 and 47 days. 
In total the KC-135 depot maintenance operation uses 18 docks, with an average of 22 
aircraft in process, to execute PDM on time and on cost (Farris, 2012).  In FY11 the maintenance 
wing exceeded customer expectations by processing 64 aircraft through PDM, crushing the 58 
aircraft target.  The maintenance wing has been embarking on a focused effort to bring KC-135 
PDM flow day average to 130 days since March 2009. As part of this initiative over 300 rapid 
improvement events have been executed, an enterprise value stream map for KC-135 was 
developed and a constraint buster team was established for working tough, short fuse activities.  
The recent progress toward their goal of a 130 day flow time is a testament to the team’s 
dedication and perseverance. 
 
2.4 Relevant Published Literature 
A literature review was conducted to determine what aspects of Heroics have been 
examined and to what extent modeling and simulation had been used as a tool to quantify 
Heroics.  In general, the broad issue of actions similar to Heroics was not well documented 
among the publications and presentations available, while individual aspects of it, such as 
cannibalization policy, were covered in depth.  The majority of prior work omits a rigorous 
quantification of the impact of Heroics in any manner, instead focusing on demand 
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forecasting/scheduling and procurement process improvements to meet part demand.  These 
topics are important; addressing the issue of parts availability and potentially reducing the need 
for Heroics.  When quantification of the impact of Heroics was attempted, it was determined by 
speculative means and left out critical elements that contribute to the total cost of executing a 
Heroic action.  The most relevant publications are summarized below. 
In August 2011 AFMC Commander General Hoffman issued a formal suspense, via 
AFMC/A4, for data regarding the cost of line stoppages caused by parts shortage at each of the 
Depots (“Bullet Background paper on Cost of Line Stoppage Caused by Parts Shortages”, 2011).  
This request was generated in a discussion of ways to increase efficiencies within depot 
operations.  Among the specific actions and considerations to be investigated included “flow 
days, CAP waivers, CANNs, job routing” etc.  Most of these are references to heroic actions as 
defined in section 2.2; ‘CANNs’ refers to AMARG and depot cannibalizations, ‘CAP waivers’ 
refers to depot and field deferrals and ‘job routing’ refers to local manufacture and non-
economical repair actions.  The formal response from the Depots to AFMC contained a mix of 
quantitative and qualitative data; a summary of the quantitative data (for FY11 to date) is shown 
in Table 1.  Qualitatively the report points out that the actions referenced above can cause 
production delays and do increase costs at the depot.  The Depots also assert that “Without more 
detailed logistics decision support system capabilities, this effort is currently more art than 
science…” (“Bullet Background paper on Cost of Line Stoppage Caused by Parts Shortages”, 
2011). 
The lone attempt found to quantify the impact of Heroics in open literature, in any terms 
(cost, man-hours, count, etc.), was outlined in a publication titled ‘The Lean Value Chain for 
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Critical Part Procurement’ (Painter, 2002).  This effort was primarily focused on reducing the 
time to identify and resolve “critical part needs” (Painter, 2002).  Painter defined a critical part as 
Table 1: Quantitative Input to AFMC Data Call (“Bullet Background paper on Cost of Line 
Stoppage Caused by Parts Shortages”, 2011) 
Cost Factors OC-ALC OO-ALC WR-ALC 
Overtime (OT) for CANN and 
Rob (non job-routed part) 
Actions 
$0.8M Data pending* $1.0M 
Customer Support Buys 
Necessary due to Supply 
System Non-delivery 
$2.2M 
(combination of 
AF and DLA-
managed parts) 
Data pending* Data pending* 
Local Manufacture Necessary 
due to Supply System Non-
delivery 
$1.7M Data pending* Data pending* 
Standby (Idle Worker) Costs Data pending* $5.0M Data pending* 
*Centers responded differently to the open data call; a standardized response is in work. 
   
 “any part whose anticipated or actual lack of availability will prevent on-time completion of the 
weapon system maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) process”.  According to Painter’s 
definition, a critical part would be a part that has the identified potential to require a Heroic 
action.  An attempt to quantify the impact of the Lean Value Chain effort was made by 
estimating the labor hours spent by mechanics chasing parts via a survey of the mechanics 
themselves.  The survey indicated that mechanics spend up to 3 hours per day chasing parts after 
implementation of the Lean Value Chain software solution. 
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Gill (2011), Chief of the 76th
In a different effort, Fisher and Brennan (1986) present a comparison of several varying 
cannibalization policy’s performance in aircraft maintenance operations.   The authors describe a 
discrete event simulation based on a SLAM software package with spares, repair operations and 
resource constraints.  The comparison was based on backorder level and consisted of policies 
that ranged from no cannibalizations to cannibalize every time there is an opportunity.  
Backorder level, in this context, was used to note aircraft that were waiting on parts.  The 
different policies created an 18% difference in backorder level from the ‘worst’ policy to the 
‘best’.  This work provides a basis for use of simulation in analysis of Heroic actions, but focuses 
solely on cannibalization leaving out many other alternatives to supply a part via Heroics during 
depot operations.     
 MXW Transformation at Tinker AFB, executed an analysis 
of parts that received no-bids during the procurement process. No-bids occur when the 
government solicitation for a part does not receive any quotes or bidders. This issue is of 
particular concern for aging aircraft where the original parts suppliers no longer exist or cannot 
produce the part at a cost deemed to be reasonable by procurement authorities.  Gill’s analysis 
attempted to estimate what price the DLA should be willing to pay for the part in order to fulfill 
the depot’s demand for the part.  The report’s findings indicated that the government could offer 
up to 500% of current book prices for hard to procure components with a minimal impact on 
total cost of procured parts for the KC-135.  By the author’s admission, this analysis was not 
widely accepted by the depot or DLA community and did not influence parts procurement 
processes.  While details of this study were not entirely clear as they were presented, the report 
did not attempt to incorporate the cost of Heroic actions as part of the cost the government would 
be willing to pay for a part or the quantity ordered. 
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Other publications related to the simulation of AF depot operations include an AFIT 
thesis on analysis of B-1 High Velocity Maintenance (HVM) (Yee, 2011).  This effort identified 
supply factors that affected the HVM process.  HVM for the B-1 had not been fully implemented 
when this analysis occurred.  Of special note for this thesis was the use of modeling and 
simulation when detailed data did not exist.  Another AFIT thesis (Shyong, 2002), used 
simulation to evaluate the impact of changes to logistics support plans and schedules in reducing 
depot maintenance cycle times and work in process levels for the F101 low pressure turbine 
rotor.  
This literature review presents the available thoughts and ideas behind prior work related 
to heroics.  Individual actions have been thoroughly examined (Fisher & Brennan, 1986), while 
their aggregate effect has not been established.  Prior efforts to quantify cost of heroics have 
relied heavily on an interview process (Painter, 2000) or ignored certain critical elements of the 
cost of a heroic action (Gill, 2011).  From this review it can be concluded that a quantitative 
analysis of the aggregate impact of heroic actions has not be definitively undertaken. 
 
2.5 Summary 
The manifestation of heroic actions is caused by the inability of the current procurement 
process to satisfy 100% of the demand for components generated by maintenance operations.  In 
this chapter, an understanding and definition of the various heroic actions that depot operators 
may encounter and utilize was identified, a background on the KC-135 and standard depot 
processes was established and a review of open literature has shown evidence that modeling and 
simulation is a plausible means for assessing the impact of heroic action on depot processes.  The 
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next chapter will detail the construction of a simulation used to assess the impact of heroics on 
depot operations.  
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III. Methodology 
 
3.1 Overview 
This chapter details the conceptual model and development of the simulation created 
during this effort.  This simulation was developed to incorporate elements of depot production, 
the need for heroic actions and their interaction at the depot.  To assess the impact of heroics on 
depot maintenance operations a baseline model was developed, which reflected the system 
current state, as well as a comparison model developed based on an assumed increase in part 
procurement efficiency or increased spare parts budget.  A description of the conceptual model 
presented was largely developed using information received during discussions with KC-135 
maintenance staff.  The baseline and comparison simulations are thoroughly discussed along 
with the development of the input data for these models.      
 
3.2 Conceptual Model Development and Description 
As part of the preparation for the development of a simulation to determine the impact of 
heroic actions on depot processes, a conceptual model was developed. This model, shown as 
Figure 4, was developed based on interactions with KC-135 engineering staff and 654th
 
 
maintenance staff.  The intent was to capture the generation of part demand through depot 
operations, general inventory levels, the supply of parts to include both heroic and the normal 
procurement processes and how/where these processes interact.  This model was used as a basis 
for abstracting the real system into Arena. 
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Figure 4: Conceptual Model 
 
Heroics become an issue on the maintenance floor when the current parts supply process 
is not able to meet current demand generated by depot operations.  Depot operations are 
described in this model as four distinct sections; arrival at the depot, inspecting the aircraft, 
executing the required PDM actions, and the aircraft leaving the system.  After arrival, each 
aircraft was inspected for damage that would be above and beyond the regular PDM package.  
After this step was completed for a given aircraft, the bill of materials for that aircraft is 
negotiated between the aircraft program office and the wing.  This activity is noted as the lighter 
arrow labeled as ‘Generate Known Parts Demand’ in Figure 4.  The bill of materials highlights 
parts that are required to complete the maintenance which are not in the current inventory.  If a 
part is not currently available, the procurement options are listed and a course of action chosen.  
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The program office and wing staff could choose to wait for a planned delivery of parts from a 
contracted source or choose to execute one or more of the heroic actions described in Chapter II.  
Once the part is procured through whatever method chosen, the part is placed in inventory and is 
then available to the shop floor for use.  
Once the bill of materials is generated and sent to signal the need for a procurement 
decision, the aircraft moves to the ‘Process AC’ section.  This section represents the entire 
portion of mechanical work on the aircraft.  It is anticipated that if parts are not available in 
inventory as part of the normal fulfillment process or a heroic one, there will be a delay in 
processing the aircraft.  There are also several heroic actions noted as part of this section; depot 
cannibalization, depot deferral and field deferral. These actions are noted here because they are 
not procurement processes in the manner that procurement is usually considered.  While these 
actions effectively ‘generate’ a part for use during maintenance, they do not actually make a new 
part available. Cannibalization removes a part from another aircraft on the maintenance floor.  
Depot and field deferrals are actions taken that extend the life of the part on the aircraft for a 
length of time determined by an inspection plan established by wing and program office 
engineers.  Another interesting action that occurs in this section of the conceptual flow is that 
new component demand is established (see lighter arrow labeled ‘Generate ‘Surprise’ Parts 
Demand’ in Figure 4) on occasion.  Depot staff stated that most components that need 
replacement are identified during the ‘Inspect AC for Damage’ section, however, there are cases 
when a defective part is not identified until later in the aircraft processing section, as captured in 
this conceptual model.   
Once all required parts are procured and all maintenance actions are complete, the aircraft 
leaves the depot and returns to service. 
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3.3 Model Assumptions 
Using the conceptual model previously outlined, a simulation of the impact of heroics 
was developed for this effort.  Several assumptions were made in the leap from conceptual model 
to Arena simulation based on limitations in available data or for ease of implementation in 
Arena.  These assumptions are listed below. 
 
• Only parts that require a heroic action to fulfill a demand are modeled.  The contracting 
processes for normal part procurement and supply are not explicitly modeled.  
 
• Only heroic actions that are required to complete a process in the SBUP dock are 
modeled.  Most of the actions that were present in the available data could be linked to SBUP 
and subject matter experts from the wing supported the exclusion of heroic actions linked to 
other PDM docks. 
 
• The conceptual model (discussed in section 3.2) asserted that component demand was 
primarily generated after I-Dock and some new component requirements would develop in later 
PDM phases.  For this simulation, demand generated during later PDM phases is not explicitly 
modeled, but is included with demand generated after I-Dock inspections. 
 
• Each sub process in SBUP consists of a base processing time and an unknown delay until 
all required parts supplied through modeled heroic actions are available. 
 
• No explicit manpower resources are modeled. 
 
• This model only incorporates the flow days impact of four heroic actions of the eight 
previously identified: depot cannibalization, AMARG, emergency buy and lateral support.  Data 
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was not available for building a model that incorporated deferral actions, field installations, non-
economical repair and depot manufacturing. 
 
3.4 Baseline Discrete Event Simulation 
Using the conceptual model outlined in section 3.2 and the assumptions listed in section 
3.3, a simulation was developed in Arena.  This section outlines the development of this model.  
The baseline model for assessing the impact of heroic actions on depot maintenance operations 
was divided into two major subsections: depot maintenance operations and heroic actions for 
component supply.  
 
3.4.1 KC-135 Programmed Depot Maintenance Model 
The depot maintenance operations in this discrete even simulation follow the general 
flow shown in Figure 5 below. 
 
 
Figure 5: Simulation Process Flow 
 
 The first section of the model, ‘AC Generation’, was where each aircraft entity was 
generated and assigned several initial identifying attributes.  Each entity was assigned a unique 
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tail number used for tracking needed parts in the system.  This portion of the model was 
implemented using an Arena create and assign module.  Aircraft entities arrived at a constant rate 
of one every six days.  This data was provided by the KC-135 master scheduler, who plans and 
tracks aircraft arrivals to the depot. 
 Pre-Dock was modeled by a simple delay with no resource requirements for the process.  
Typically this operation is not a processing constraint and capacity is not a concern.  I-Dock was 
modeled by a process module with capacity restricted by the number of available docks at the 
depot.  These docks were modeled as resources and required to complete the I-Dock portion of 
the model. 
 As in actual depot operations, the Bill of Materials (BOM) to process an aircraft through 
PDM is generated after I-Dock in the ‘Generate PDM BOM’ section of the model.   The Arena 
implementation of this process is shown in Figure 6.  In the first assign block counter attributes 
are assigned for use in processing in the ‘Notify Heroic Process’ section of the model.  The next 
four assign blocks determine the number of heroic actions that are required to process the aircraft 
entity through the PDM operations.  The number of each action was determined by an input 
distribution developed based on actual data provided by DLA and KC-135 Program Office 
personnel, over an approximately 12 month period.  For AMARG pull each aircraft entity is 
assigned a value for the number of actions that it requires to process through each sub process in 
the SBUP phase (frequency distributions and SBUP sub process break down described in detail 
in subsequent paragraphs).  The value is stored in a two dimensional variable, AMARG(i,j), 
where the row index is the assigned tail number and the column index is the SBUP sub process 
number.  This setup is duplicated for assigning lateral supply and emergency buy requirements.  
For example, an aircraft entity with tail number set to 14 may be assigned a requirement for one 
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AMARG cannibalization, one emergency buy and zero lateral support for sub process 1.  This 
would correspond to  AMARG(14,1) = 1  ,  EBuy(14,1) = 1  and  Lateral(14,1) = 0  .   
 
 
Figure 6: Arena Implementation of ‘Generate PDM BOM’ 
 
 Depot cannibalizations were handled differently than the other three heroic actions in this 
model.  Each aircraft entity is assigned two values for the number of cannibalizations that it 
requires to complete processing: one for parts that the aircraft needs and one for parts that are 
given away to other aircraft.  This logic intentionally did not explicitly pair specific tail numbers 
for receiving or losing parts, but accounts for the delay involved for an aircraft undergoing either 
type of action.  These values are based on distributions developed from data provided by the 
maintenance wing at Tinker AFB.  Data was available only for the tail number needing the part 
to be cannibalized with no information given regarding the frequency of an aircraft losing a part 
during a cannibalization action.  We therefore used the same distributions, with independent 
random number draws for received and donated parts for each aircraft, for each SBUP sub 
process.  The cannibalization values were stored in a two dimensional variable, CANN(i,j), where 
i is the assigned tail number and j one through six, are the values for needing a part though SBUP 
sub process one through six and j seven though twelve are the values for losing a part though 
SBUP sub process one through six. 
 The next group of Arena modules, ‘Notify Heroic Processes’ shown in Figure 7, was 
where the processes for executing AMARG cannibalization, lateral supply and emergency buys 
Heroics
Initiate AMARGComplete Profile Heroics
Initiate EBuy
Heroics
Initiate Lateral
Heroics
Initiate CANN
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were notified (through a signal in Arena) of a component demand to be satisfied by that heroic 
process. The logic for the heroic processes is discussed in section 3.4.2. 
 
 
Figure 7: Arena Implementation for ‘Notify Heroic Processes’ 
 
The aircraft entity processes through this loop for the number of sub processes in the 
model (six).  When an entity enters the loop it triggers the release signals (first three modules in 
Figure 7) for the required AMARG cannibalizations, emergency buys and lateral supplies for the 
first process. These signals trigger the release of entities from their hold modules in the heroic 
action process logic, to be discussed later.  The process index is incremented and when the 
process increment is greater than six, the entity leaves the loop. 
 SBUP was broken down into sub processes based on a work break-down structure (WBS) 
that was provided by the KC-135 maintenance wing at Tinker AFB.  Processes were grouped 
based on their approximate timing in the process flow. Processes that roughly occurred 
simultaneously with a critical path task were rolled into a single sub process for our simulation as 
shown in Figure 8.  Here 24 tasks on the KC-135 WBS were consolidated to 6 sub processes for  
Signal AMARG Index
Increment Process Loop True
False
Dummy DelaySignal EBuy Signal Lateral
0      
     0
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Figure 8: KC-135 SBUP Sub Process Breakdown 
 
our model.  This breakdown was vetted by wing staff and determined to be reasonable since 
most of the dependencies within this WBS followed the critical path tasks (highlighted in black 
on Figure 8). 
System Checks and Post Dock were modeled in a similar manner as I-Dock with capacity 
restricted by number of available docks. 
 
3.4.2 Heroic Actions Process 
The heroic parts fulfillment process flow for AMARG cannibalization, lateral supply and 
emergency buy were implemented in Arena using a separate entity flow for each type of heroic 
action as displayed as Figure 9. 
 
Major_Job TASK Gate Model Process DURATION
12 13 14 15 16 # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
CA AS Trailing edge SBUP Process 1 7 days
CG AA/AE Replace Windows / Cockpit / I-DOCK Process 1 9 days
C5 AS Wing / LE Defects SBUP Process 1 8 days
CD Wheel Well/Keel Beam SBUP Process 2 6 days
CC AS Cockpit/Latrine SBUP Process 2 4 days
CN Struts / Cowling Defects SBUP Process 2 6 days
CQ AS  Exterior SBUP Process 3 7 days
CK AH Build-Up SBUP Process 3 8 days
CV Strut Build-Up SBUP Process 3 3 days
CS AS Interior Cargo SBUP Process 3 7 days
CH BA Build-Up SBUP Process 3 3 days
C3 Engine Installation SBUP Process 3 2 days
CE Lower Nose / Electrics TCTOs SBUP Process 3 6 days
CU Power On SBUP Process 3 2 days
CR Flight Control / Boom Installation SBUP Process 3 4 days
CM AE Build-Up Wings SBUP Process 4 4 days
CJ Pitot Static SBUP Process 4 1 day
CW AS Backing Board Mod SBUP Process 4 2 days
CX AA Build-Up SBUP Process 4 6 days
CZ AG Fuel 1 SBUP Process 4 6 days
CP Wing Tip Installation SBUP Process 4 2 days
CT AA/AE Interior Build-Up SBUP Process 5 6 days
C2 Wing Tip Wiring / Fuel Quantity SBUP Process 5 2 days
CY Control Column Installation SBUP Process 6 2 days
C7 Structures/Build-up Release Point SBUP 0 days
I-Dock SBUP
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Figure 9: Heroic Parts Fulfillment Arena Implementation 
 
At the beginning of each simulation replication 1000 heroic action entities are created 
and placed in a hold module using parallel logic for AMARG cannibalization, lateral supply, and 
emergency buy processes (AMARG shown in Figure 9).  The entities are released from the hold 
module upon receipt of the appropriate signal, per the logic in the ‘Notify Heroic Processes’ loop 
(see Figure 7), and sent for assignment designation. Each heroic action entity represents an 
individual part obtained through that heroic action required by a specific aircraft tail number at a 
particular SBUP process.  The heroic action entities are then sent through a delay module, which 
represents the delay time for processing the action from initial request to part delivery and 
subsequent availability on shop floor.  After processing is complete (the part is available to the 
maintenance operation), the heroic action entity is sent to a queue specified by tail number and 
SBUP process.  For example, if aircraft entity 17 required 3 AMARG pulls to complete sub 
process 1, each of the three heroic action entities, upon completion of processing would be sent 
AMARG Ticket AMARG Attrib Process AMARGAMARG Form Bin Process 1
AMARG Hold
AMARG Queues
A_ Pro c e s s _ Nu m ==1
A_ Pro c e s s _ Nu m ==2
A_ Pro c e s s _ Nu m ==3
A_ Pro c e s s _ Nu m ==4
A_ Pro c e s s _ Nu m ==5
Els e
Process 2
AMARG Hold
Process 3
AMARG Hold
Process 4
AMARG Hold
Process 5
AMARG Hold
Process 6
AMARG Hold
0      
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to the queue titled ‘AMARG Process 1 Tail 17’. The number in each assigned queue represents 
the number of parts available from each heroic action for use by the assigned aircraft tail number 
and sub process.  This value is evaluated by the appropriate aircraft tail number at the 
appropriate sub process as a condition to proceed to the next sub process or on to System Check. 
 Because of the different logic used to generate depot cannibalizations as discussed in 
section 3.4.1, cannibalization fulfillment did not require an explicit delay to wait for a part as did 
the other three modeled heroic actions. Therefore the cannibalization fulfillment logic is captured 
in the circled loop shown in Figure 10 based upon the number of assigned cannibalization 
actions for that tail number, for each of the six sub processes of SBUP. The wait block following 
this loop in Figure 10 captures all the associated delays for the other modeled heroic actions. 
Each of the six sub processes in SBUP follows this same logic, with the last sup process flowing 
into systems check.   
 
 
Figure 10: Arena Implementation of Depot Cannibalization Delay 
 
3.5 Input Data 
Data described in Section 3.4 was obtained from various sources for input into the model.  
The following sections describe the methodology for obtaining the data and transforming it for 
useful input for the model. 
Process 1 1 Parts
Wait for ProcessCANN Process 1Process 1 CANN Loop
True
Fals e
Assign
Process 1 CANN
Time
Process 1 Heroic
End Time
Process 1 Heroic
     0
0      
     0
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3.5.1 Depot Operations Process Times 
Process cycle time data for Pre Dock, I-Dock, Systems Check and Post Dock was 
provided by the 564th
Table 2
 AMXS in a presentation titled “564 AMXS Way Ahead” briefed by Ms 
Theresa Farris (Farris, 2012). The briefing provided dock level cycle times for the prior ten 
aircraft to pass through that phase.  Since the data was extremely limited, a formal input analysis 
method using Arena Input Analyzer was not used. Instead a quick look was taken, noting the 
minimum value, maximum data and the value that appeared to occur most frequently.  These 
values were used to create triangular process cycle time distributions for the four processes 
modeled at the dock level.  SBUP was included in the prior data set, but another method was 
used as described in the following paragraphs.  The final input distributions or constants are 
shown in . 
SBUP was broken down in the model to six sub processes. An investigation into how 
cycle time data was collected at the depot during PDM indicated that reliable data at the major 
job level was not available.  So an alternate method for obtaining input data had to be developed.  
The WBS, provided by the 564th Figure 8 AMXS, shown in , included a column for nominal job 
time and a task designated as schedule buffer to reflect occasions when the actual cycle time was 
greater than the planning number. It was assumed (and deemed reasonable by the 564th AMXS) 
that the planning number for major job cycle time consisted of the anticipated time to complete 
the job with some consideration of manufacturing task variation. It was also assumed (and 
similarly validated) that that planning time did not include process delays due to unavailable 
parts and that any delay due to parts availability issues could be added to the planning number 
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Table 2: Depot PDM Cycle Time Input 
  Distribution Units 
Pre Dock TRIA() Days 
I-Dock TRIA() Days 
Structures Build Up   Days 
Process 1 8 Days 
Process 2 7 Days 
Process 3 9 Days 
Process 4 8 Days 
Process 5 6 Days 
Process 6 2 Days 
Systems Check TRIA() Days 
Post Dock TRIA() Days 
TRIA – Expression pulls values from a triangular 
distribution with the given parameters 
 
and be used as a reasonable estimate for actual cycle time.  Based on these assumptions, the 
planning cycle time numbers for the rolled up SBUP major jobs were used as the modeled cycle 
times for the six sub processes.  
 
3.5.2 Heroic Action Process Times 
Data recording instances of heroic actions was primarily found in logs, maintained by 
individual and disparate groups at the wing.  Depot cannibalization data and AMARG 
cannibalization data was obtained from records kept by the Tanker Production Support Group 
(564th AMXS/MXDXAB).   The data for depot cannibalizations for the KC-135 was broken 
down by action date, part number, national stock number (NSN), part name, source of supply 
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and gaining aircraft tail number.  Installation and removal hours were also provided in the data, 
but review of these numbers revealed that most of them were input as ‘0.1’ hours.  This was the 
negotiated rate that the 564th AMXS can charge the KC-135 Program office for depot 
cannibalizations and was not an accurate reflection of the real time it takes to remove and install 
a cannibalized component (Kaminski, 2011).  No other source of data was found that reliably 
captured the time to process a depot cannibalization, so subject matter expertise from the 564th
Table 3
 
AMXS/MXPAA was elicited to develop the distribution recorded in .  
 
Table 3: Heroic Action Cycle Time Input 
 
Distribution Units 
Depot Cannibalization UNIF(.5, 8) Hours 
AMARG Cannibalization TRIA(30, 35, 45) Days 
Lateral Supply UNIF(3, 5) Days 
Emergency Buy TRIA(, ) Days 
TRIA – Expression pulls values from a triangular 
distribution with the given parameters 
UNIF – Expression pulls values from a uniform 
distribution with the given parameters 
 
The subject matter expert reasoned that cannibalizing a component can take a short 
amount of time, approximately half an hour, but that the wing would not cannibalize a 
component that would take longer than a shift (8 hours) to remove (Rayner, 2012).  These values 
were used as the minimum and maximum values for a uniform distribution since there was no 
other information available to support any other input for the model. 
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 The data for AMARG cannibalizations for the KC-135 was broken down by request date, 
NSN, part name and quantity.  The logs provided by the Tanker Support Group lacked several 
key pieces of information; tail number and received date.  Since no received date was recorded a 
distribution for AMARG processing/delivery times could not be developed empirically. As with 
depot cannibalization, subject matter expertise was elicited (Palacios, 2012) for the distribution 
of processing/delivery times for parts supplied through the AMARG.  The subject matter expert 
was able to provide a minimum, maximum and most frequently observed delivery time for input 
as a triangular distribution.  The final distribution for input was recorded in Table 3. 
 Lateral supply and emergency buy logs were provided by the DLA KC-135 Support 
office (DLA Aviation/QAAEXAA).  The logs for lateral support actions were broken down by 
request date, NSN, Base Code, part description and quantity.  Again, these logs lacked data with 
a tail number and received date.  As with the prior actions, subject matter expertise was elicited 
(Rayner, 2012) for the distribution of processing/delivery times for parts supplied through lateral 
support.  The subject matter experts were able to provide a minimum, maximum and most 
frequently observed delivery time for input as a triangular distribution.  The final distribution for 
input was recorded in Table 3. 
 The logs for emergency buy actions were broken down by request date, received date, 
NSN, part number, part description and quantity.  Again, these logs lacked data with a tail 
number but a received date field was available for analysis!  The fulfillment time was used as 
input into the Arena Input Analyzer software. The initial software recommendation was a gamma 
distribution with a p value of 0.22.  Since the gamma distribution was only bounded [0, ∞], a 
triangular distribution was selected as the final input. The final distribution for input was 
recorded in Table 3. 
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3.5.3 Heroic Action Frequency Distributions 
The data logs, briefly outlined in section 3.5.2, were used to develop aircraft profiles 
which specified the number of each heroic action that each entity would require to complete each 
of the six sub processes in SBUP.  The building of these profiles was implemented in Arena 
using assign modules (see Figure 6).  To construct the dataset for a frequency distribution of 
each action per sub process, several different pieces of data were used.  
The logs provided by the DLA and 564th AMXS staff did not include which process the 
specified part was required for.  To link each part to a depot process each NSN needed to be 
matched with a ‘major job’ code.  This code is used to designate each task level operation at the 
depot. A key that linked major job code to each task (and further, model sub process) was also 
required. To address these needs, a bill of materials for the KC-135 was provided that contained 
each NSN and its associated major job code.  The NSNs from the logs were formatted, in Excel, 
to match the NSN format of the NSNs in the bill of materials.  Then a simple lookup command, 
based on NSN, was used to pull in the major job code into the log data set.  Since the log data 
was entered by hand, there were many instances of mistyped NSNs that did not find a match in 
the bill of materials data set.  When this occurred, the data was reviewed manually, attempting to 
reasonable match the log data to a bill of materials NSN.  There were many times where this 
process was successful in reconciling the data and there were others where it was not.  When a 
reasonable match was not found between the two data sets, the log line item was omitted from 
the final data set. 
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Once each log line item had been matched to a major job code, the WBS provided by 
wing staff was used to match major job codes to tasks under the WBS.  This was accomplished 
in Excel using a similar approach as described previously.  After matching each log entry with a 
major job code, the log entry was matched with the appropriate model sub process.  This 
completes the method for building the data sets to include the depot task and useful incorporation 
into the described model. 
As stated previously, for AMARG cannibalizations, lateral support and emergency buy 
actions there was no tail number provided in the logs to support an explicit per aircraft analysis.  
But when the total count for these three actions was broken down by sub process, the average per 
aircraft was less than one.  To simplify the analysis, it was assumed that each aircraft could only 
have a maximum of one of these actions per sub process. This enabled the development of a 
discrete probability distribution on a per process level given that 64 aircraft passed through the 
depot during the FY11 data collection period.  A sample calculation for AMARG cannibalization 
is provided in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Sample Frequency Distribution Calculation 
Sub 
Process 
Count of AMARG 
Cannibalization 
Probability of 
1 Action Distribution 
Process 1 2 0.03 DISC(.97, 0, 1,1) 
Process 2 0 0.00 0 
Process 3 3 0.04 DISC(.96, 0, 1, 1) 
Process 4 3 0.04 DISC(.96, 0, 1, 1) 
Process 5 5 0.08 DISC(.92, 0, 1) 
Process 6 0 0.00 0 
DISC – Expression pulls values from a discrete distribution with 
given parameters 
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In this example, the count of AMARG cannibalizations was divided by the assumed 
number of aircraft passing through the system (64) for the probability of each aircraft requiring 
an AMARG action for each process.  A similar approach is used for lateral supply and 
emergency buy actions. The full set of distributions per process for each of these actions is 
provided in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Heroic Action Frequency Distributions 
 Depot 
Cannibalization 
AMARG 
Cannibalization 
Lateral Support Emergency Buy 
Process 1 DISC( .45, 0, .69, 
1, .83, 2, .94, 3, 
.98, 4, 1, 5) 
DISC(.97, 0, 1,1) DISC( .81, 0, 1, 1) DISC( .87, 0, 1, 1) 
Process 2 - - DISC( .94, 0, 1, 1) - 
Process 3 DISC( .09, 0, .28, 
1, .53, 2, .69, 3, 
.8, 4, .84, 5, .97, 
6, 1, 7) 
DISC(.96, 0, 1, 1) DISC(.54, 0, 1, 1) DISC( .78, 0, 1, 1) 
Process 4 DISC( .3, 0, .55, 
1, .75, 2, .89, 3, 
.98, 4, 1, 5) 
DISC(.96, 0, 1, 1) DISC( .91, 0, 1, 1) DISC( .98, 0, 1, 1) 
Process 5 - DISC(.92, 0, 1) DISC( .46, 0, 1, 1) DISC( .83, 0, 1, 1) 
Process 6 - - - DISC( .98, 0, 1, 1) 
DISC – Expression pulls values from a discrete distribution with given parameters 
 
 Depot cannibalization logs did provide a tail number for use in developing 
frequency distributions for each process.  A sample calculation for Depot cannibalization for sub 
process 1 is provided in Table 6. 
The number of cannibalizations per aircraft were tallied and recorded in the ‘Frequency’ 
column in Table 6.  Since aircraft with zero cannibalizations were not included in the data set, 64 
was used as the nominal number of aircraft that went through the depot and used to calculate the 
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frequency value for zero occurrences.  The ‘Frequency’ tally was divided by 64 for the 
probability of that tally.  A discrete distribution was then developed from the probabilities and 
the tally they represented.  The same process was used for the development of the remaining sub 
process distributions for depot cannibalizations. 
 
Table 6: Depot Cannibalization Frequency Distribution Sample Calculation 
Sub Process Count  Frequency Probability Distribution 
Pr
oc
es
s 1
 
0 29 0.45 
DISC( .45, 0, .69, 1, .83, 2, .94, 3, .98, 4, 1, 5) 
1 15 0.24 
2 9 0.14 
3 7 0.11 
4 3 0.04 
5 1 0.02 
DISC – Expression pulls values from a discrete distribution with given parameters 
 
3.6 Verification and Validation 
To ensure that this model functioned as intended a phased modeling approach was used.  
First a simple system with one sub process and one heroic action was constructed with constant 
numbers of the action assigned to each entity.  Variable displays were placed on the Arena 
workspace for visual verification that the entities were functioning properly within the system 
(i.e. waiting for the right parts before exiting).  Primary variables used in the observation 
exercise were the number of heroic actions required to complete processing for the first entity 
and the number of heroic actions which have completed processing for that entity.   
 The next phase was the development of a system with one sub process and the four heroic 
actions that were to be in the full and final model.  The use of variable displays was also the 
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primary means of verifying that the model was functioning properly. This process was used 
again for the transition to a model with multiple sub processes and multiple heroic actions.  This 
step by step process with each phase including more and more complexity made verifying the 
function of the model simple and reduced the amount of trouble shooting required on the model 
with full complexity.  
Key measures of the model output were also identified and collected as statistics within 
the model.  Aircraft PDM cycle time and average number of aircraft in process were statistics 
collected for validation purposes.  These values compared favorably with data supplied by the 
program office (section 4.3 details this comparison). 
In addition to statistics collected for validation, statistics were also collected to obtain an 
estimate of the number of production hours lost due to heroic actions.  These statistics were 
collected using assign modules throughout the process flow.  Data on how much time was lost 
over a given time frame due to heroic action was not available from the depots and would be 
useful for assessing the impact of heroics on depot operations in terms of aircraft flow days and 
as a surrogate for the cost of these actions. 
 
3.7 Development of Comparison System 
An alternate scenario was developed to assess the impact of additional funding for spare 
parts or for the benefits of an improved procurement method.  One way of doing this is to modify 
the input data of the model, rerun the model and compare the collected data with the baseline 
model.  To accomplish this, the heroic action data from section 3.5.3 was revisited. Using the 
same lookup method outlined previously the replacement factor for each part was matched with 
37 
 
each heroic action. The replacement factor is a figure used by program office analysis to 
determine the average rate of replacement per aircraft. This is a number between zero and one, 
with one indicating a need to replace the part for each aircraft that goes through depot.  
The heroic actions with a replacement factor greater than 0.8 were removed from the data 
and the heroic action frequencies were recalculated using the methodology used to establish the 
baseline model.  The revised input is included in Table 7 as an approximation to represent the 
case where additional funds had been given to DLA and GLSC for ordering and managing part 
inventories with these extra funds spent on parts with high replacement probabilities. Using the 
 
Table 7: Alternate Scenario Heroic Action Frequency Distributions 
  CANN AMARG Lateral Emergency Buy 
Process 1 DISC( .48, 0, .77, 
1, .86, 2, .98, 3, 1, 
4) 
DISC(.97, 0, 1,1) DISC( .85, 0, 1, 1)  DISC( .92, 0, 1, 1) 
Process 2 - - DISC( .94, 0, 1, 1)  - 
Process 3 DISC( .19, 0, .45, 
1, .70, 2, .88, 3, 
.92, 4, .94, 5, 1, 6) 
DISC(.97, 0, 1, 1)  DISC( .64, 0, 1, 1)  DISC( .84, 0, 1, 1) 
Process 4 DISC( .36, 0, .64, 
1, .83, 2, .94, 3, 
.98, 4, 1, 5) 
DISC(.96, 0, 1, 1)  DISC( .91, 0, 1, 1)  DISC( .98, 0, 1, 1) 
Process 5 - DISC(.92, 0, 1,1) DISC( .62, 0, 1, 1)  DISC( .89, 0, 1, 1) 
Process 6 - - - DISC( .98, 0, 1, 1) 
DISC – Expression pulls values from a discrete distribution with given parameters 
 
revised data did change some of the input distributions for the heroic actions, especially depot 
cannibalization, while others remained unchanged. 
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3.8 Summary 
This section outlined the development of a simulation for the assessment of the impact of 
heroic actions on depot processes.  Discussions with program offices and maintenance wing staff 
resulted in a conceptual model for the interaction of depot processes and heroic actions.  This 
model was then translated into the Arena simulation software.  Data for inclusion in the model 
was difficult to obtain and was significantly lacking on multiple occasions. The process used for 
transforming the depot data obtained for this effort into model input was also described in this 
chapter.  Model verification and validation as well as the development of an alternate state of the 
system were also described.  The next chapter discusses the results and analysis of our simulation 
study. 
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IV. Results and Analysis 
 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter details the results and analysis from the simulation described in Chapter III.  
The focus of this analysis is to obtain insight into the impact of heroic actions on depot processes 
in terms of flow days and cost.  This section discusses simulation run setup and the process used 
to determine run setup parameters.  Initial results from the baseline model are assessed against 
summary data from the real system for the rough time frame that the input data was provided 
from as validation of the model.  An analysis of the baseline case and the alternate inventory 
funding scenario is included. This assessment compares flow days and time delay due to heroic 
actions.   
It is expected that by incorporating the cost of heroic actions into the total cost of chosen 
inventory levels, that procurement and inventory funding decisions may be managed differently.  
This section details the estimation of a cost of heroics curve and subsequent comparison with 
estimated total inventory costs for the KC-135 PDM operations. 
 
4.2 Simulation Run Setup  
For this simulation, the steady state statistics were of primary interest.  Since the 
simulation starting state is idle and empty, a warm up period was specified in Arena.  To 
establish a reasonable warm up time, the model was set to run until 300 aircraft had exited the 
model, and for 10 replications.  The Output Analyzer was used to plot KC-135 cycle times by 
model run time and identify the point where the impact of the model initial conditions visually 
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appeared to have left the data (see Figure 11).  The black line, in Figure 11, at 250 days denotes 
the point in the simulation where the model output was reasonably distant from the effects of the 
model’s initial conditions.   
 
 
Figure 11: KC-135 Warm Up Period Determination 
  
 For the data generation described in subsequent sections the model was run for a total of 
510 days, which consists of a 250 day warm up period and a 260 day period used to generate 
statistics.  The 260 day period represents one full year of processing at the depot (five days per 
week, 52 weeks per year). This time frame was selected to ensure that a reasonable comparison 
could be made between the model output and data obtained regarding the actual maintenance 
operations.  Fifty replications were executed to obtain the full data set for each scenario.  Fifty 
replications reliably yielded half widths on flow day metrics of one to two days and deemed 
sufficient for this study.  Computational time for this model was negligible, executing all 50 
replications within one minute when animation was disabled. 
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4.3 Validation 
Once all input data and model runtime parameters were finalized, statistics were collected 
for evaluation.  Two primary metrics were available for comparing the baseline model against 
data collected from KC-135 PDM operations; average PDM cycle time (flow days) and the 
average number of aircraft in process.  A summary of these statistics is shown in Table 8. It 
should also be noted that our model was driven with an aircraft arrival rate of one aircraft every 
six days based upon subject matter expert input.  This equates to 43 arrivals over a year of 260 
modeled working days. 
 
Table 8: Validation Statistics 
 
 The model shows an average PDM cycle time of 143 (95% Confidence Interval; [143.9, 
144.1]) versus an empirical average cycle time of 159 days, a difference of roughly 16 days.  The 
range covered by the model minimum and maximum average cycle time does include the 
empirical average. Since four of the eight heroic actions mentioned in section 2.2 are not 
included in our model this appears reasonable.  A less reasonable result would have been that the 
model cycle time being significantly higher.  Other possibilities for mismatch reside with the 
 
KC-135 
FY11 
Baseline 
Model 
Average 
Baseline Model 
95% CI 
Model 
Min 
Model 
Max 
Avg. PDM Cycle Time (Days) 159 143 [143.9, 144.1] 142 164 
Avg. Number of Aircraft in Process 22 26.20 [25.73, 26.67] 23 30 
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assumptions regarding the work content of the base cycle times in the sub processes and lack of 
empirical data for heroic processes cycle times.  
 The average number of aircraft in PDM at the depot was 22 in FY11 for the KC-135.  
The baseline model recorded an average number of aircraft in PDM of 26.20 with a maximum 
value of 30 and a minimum of 23.  The difference in the average values was about 4 aircraft, 
while the minimum model value was close to the empirically recoded average.  The discrepancy 
in empirical and model values for average number of aircraft in PDM could be due to an 
inaccurate arrival schedule or an aircraft build up after the SBUP sub process created by a shorter 
than reality cycle time. 
 Overall the model represents the real system reasonably well for aircraft cycle time and 
average number of aircraft in PDM. Although there are differences between the model and real 
system values, they can be reasonably accounted for given the assumptions and abstractions 
intentionally included in the simulation.  Our simulation provides a top level look at some of the 
dynamics of KC-135 depot operations and explicitly captures the impact of at least a subset of 
heroic actions. 
 
4.4 Comparison of Baseline and Alternate State 
An alternate scenario was developed and implemented in Arena as described in section 
3.8.  This scenario represents the occasion where the DLA and GLSC have been given an 
increased amount of funding for additional inventory or have increased their procurement 
efficiency.  We modeled this increased funding by removing all parts with a replacement factor 
greater than 0.8 from the data.  Using this comparison scenario, the impact of increased funding 
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for inventory can be assessed.  In this section both a direct comparison of the baseline and 
alternate scenario is presented along with the development of a cost of heroics curve. 
 
4.4.1 Flow Days Comparison 
The average PDM cycle time data from both the baseline and alternate model scenarios is 
shown in Table 9.   
 
Table 9: Baseline and Alternate Scenario Flow Days Comparison 
  
Avg. PDM Cycle 
Time (Days) 
Mean Difference (Days) Two Sample Comparison of Means 
95% Confidence Interval (Days) 
Baseline  143.0 
1.6 [1.16, 2.05] 
Alternate 141.0 
 
The alternate scenario generated an average PDM cycle time of 141 days, a difference of 
1.6 less flow days on average from the baseline scenario.  A two sample comparison of means 
test was executed on the data obtained from the simulation replications. This test generated a 
95% confidence interval on the replication means, shown in Table 9.  Since zero difference is not 
included in the interval, the two samples are statistically different.  Thus, being able to 
successfully procure highly used items (replacement factor greater than 0.8) would reduce flow 
days by 1.6 days on average.  This equates to about 2.2% of the baseline flow days, which may 
not represent a huge increase in flow day performance, but shop hours lost could be significant. 
The lost shop hours due to heroics is explored in the next section. 
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4.4.2 Delay Due to Heroic Action Comparison 
The total heroic time and average heroic time per aircraft over the simulation run for the 
baseline and alternate procurement scenarios are shown in Table 10 and Table 11.  The total 
heroic time is a statistic collected that sums up the time an aircraft spends in delay due to depot 
cannibalization and waiting on parts to be fulfilled via any of the other three actions across each 
of the SBUP sub processes.  And the average heroic time per aircraft is the total heroic time 
divided by the number of aircraft through PDM. 
 
Table 10: Baseline and Alternate Scenario Heroic Time Comparison 
  
Average Total 
Heroic Time (Hours) 
Mean Difference 
(Hours) 
Two Sample Comparison of Means 
95% Confidence Interval (Hours) 
Baseline  603 
394 [326, 462] Alternate 209 
 
The baseline scenario generated an average total heroic time across the simulation of 603 
hours while the alternate scenario generated a total time of 209 hours.  A two sample comparison 
of means test was executed on the data obtained from the simulation replications. This test 
generated a 95% confidence interval on the replication means, shown in Table 10.  Since zero 
difference is not included in the interval, the mean total heroic times of the alternate and baseline 
scenarios are statistically different.  Thus, being able to successfully procure highly used items 
(replacement factor greater than 0.8) would reduce the average time lost because of heroic 
actions by 394 hours. 
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Table 11: Average Heroic Time Per Aircraft 
 
Average Total Heroic 
Time per Aircraft (Hours) 
Mean Difference 
(Hours) 
Two Sample Comparison of Means 
95% Confidence Interval (Hours) 
Baseline  14.8 
6.57 [5.67, 7.46] Alternate 8.25 
 
The baseline scenario generated an average total heroic time per aircraft across the 
simulation of 14.8 hours while the alternate scenario generated a total time of 8.25 hours.  A two 
sample comparison of means test was executed on the data obtained from the simulation 
replications. This test generated a 95% confidence interval on the replication means, shown in 
Table 11.  Since zero difference is not included in the interval, the mean total heroic times of the 
alternate and baseline scenarios are statistically different.  Thus, being able to successfully 
procure highly used items (replacement factor greater than 0.8) would reduce the average time 
lost because of heroic actions by 6.57 hours per aircraft. 
 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter a discussion of simulation run setup parameter settings was discussed.  
Steady state analysis was executed and a warm up time determined based on average PDM cycle 
time.  Key simulation output was compared to empirical measures of the real system 
performance.  The simulation performed moderately well compared to these indicators and is 
reasonably suitable for estimation of time lost due to heroic actions. An alternate system was 
determined to yield statistically different results in terms of average PDM cycle time and total 
heroic time when compared with the baseline model.  The raw data from the alternate and 
46 
 
baseline models was also used to estimate two points on the curve representing the cost of heroic 
actions.  
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V. Conclusion 
5.1 Overview 
This chapter provides commentary on the results presented in our study.  The usefulness 
of the total heroic time comparison and the need for a high level model are discussed.  
Throughout the course of this effort several areas for further investigation have presented 
themselves, these opportunities are discussed in this section.  The chapter concludes with final 
remarks on establishing the impact of heroics on depot operations.  
 
5.2 Implications  
The analysis presented in section 4.4.2 showed that the total hours lost to heroics was 
significantly different and less than in the baseline case.  This case assumes that supply personnel 
will spend any additional procurement funds on parts that they know will be needed and spend it 
on the right parts in the right quantities.  A similar result was found when comparing the KC-135 
flow days (see section 4.4.1).  Further alternate scenarios could be generated to gather more 
points on the cost of heroics curve for the KC-135. 
Determining the impact of less funding for inventory on heroics, using this methodology, 
would be impossible.  However, this approach has enabled a first look at the flow day and man 
hour impacts of heroics on depot operations.  This simulation study has specifically shown that 
increased funding for spare parts could reduce the impact of heroics.  Future efforts to quantify 
these impacts by AF organizations (AFMC, depots, DLA, GLSC, etc.) could use this 
methodology, in the current data challenged environment, and gain some insight into heroics. 
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5.3 Future Work 
During this investigation, several areas for further thought and effort have presented 
themselves.  At the depot level, if there is serious interest in addressing the cost and flow day 
impacts on their operations, the current methods for capturing data when heroic actions occur 
should be reevaluated.  The existing data that was obtained for this simulation study (depot 
cannibalizations, AMARG pulls, lateral supply and emergency buy) would have been much 
more useful with the inclusion of aircraft tail numbers, need dates, and consistent use of 
request/received dates.  It also appeared that data regarding field and depot deferral actions as 
well as any records of depot manufacturing actions is not available in any useful form.  Formal 
processes do exist for managing these types of actions and some data is maintained in a database, 
but the staff at the depot could not provide any insight into how to obtain these records for 
analysis.  A future effort pertaining to this topic without more data, to echo prior comments, 
would be (at best) as much art as science. 
An interesting future analysis to undertake would be modeling the generation of heroic 
actions of a handful of parts, explicitly including a procurement process and a production 
process.  The analysis presented in this thesis presents a gross estimate of the labor hours lost due 
to heroic actions on the depot floor, but this kind of analysis leaves several important questions 
unanswered, such as; if I have more procurement funds, what parts do I buy?, how much funding 
does it take to make a significant impact of heroics costs?, or how much of this problem is 
caused by procurement inefficiencies?  A part specific/part family level analysis would be 
suitable for providing insight into these types of questions.      
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A large number of parts that generate heroic actions are categorized as low procurement 
volume, with an average replacement rate of 10% or less.  It could be possible that creative 
procurement practices could minimize the risk of not having a part when you need it, especially 
for rarely used parts but are known to be needed occasionally.  An assessment of the impact of 
these ‘creative’ procurement practices would likely be of interest to the depot community. 
 
5.4 Final Summary 
This simulation study presents a method for determining the high level impact of heroics 
on depot operations in terms of flow days and lost labor hours.  An alternate procurement 
scenario was developed and compared to the baseline system.  Using this approach the impact of 
heroic actions could be estimated and a cost of heroics curve could be generated for any AF 
weapon system or depot.  As the depots pursue their own investigation into heroic actions, any 
new data could be added to the model for increased validity.    
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